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independent nonprofit sector. With policies to build the capacity of the sector, public 
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2005/06. Theory suggests that the comparative advantage of nonprofits lies in the mission-
motivation of those who work in them, and predicts that motivated workers will accept lower 
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“Politicians once thought the man in Whitehall knew best. Now we understand that the... 
mother from the playgroup... might know better.” 
 
The Rt. Hon Gordon Brown MP (2001) 
 
Introduction 
Government intervention in a market can often have unforeseen consequences.  Studying 
the effects of a major policy change on a market can help us to understand how markets 
work, and evaluate the consequences of intervention. 
Since coming to power in 1997 the Labour government in the UK has promoted the 
involvement of the independent non-profit sector in the provision of public services.  As a 
result, the so-called voluntary sector has grown dramatically as the increasing use of 
commissioning and competitive tendering has exerted many market forces on the sector 
from which it had previously enjoyed some shelter. 
This growth has been fuelled by the rise in the number of public services contracted-out to 
the sector.  The value of government contracts with the voluntary sector increased from 
around £2 billion in 1996/97 to £6.88 billion in 2005/06 (Public Administration Select 
Committee, 2008).  This has increased the importance of the sector, both as a significant 
employer in the UK and as a key part of public service provision.  In 2003 earned income 
from contracts and trading overtook donated income as the most significant source of funds 
for UK charities (National Council of Voluntary Organisations, 2008).   
Much has been made of the distinctive advantages of the voluntary sector, rooted in the 
profit-distribution constraint and the “warm glow” of motivated workers.  We ask, what 
effect has the exogenous shock of the government-supported expansion of the sector had 
on the make-up of the voluntary sector workforce? 
This paper focuses on the paid workforce in the voluntary sector to examine the effect of the 
sector’s growth on pay levels and the wage differentials between sectors.  We show that the 
theory of compensating differentials predicts that the warm-glow wage discount will fall as 
the sector expands.  Using data from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS), we find that while 
there is evidence of lower voluntary sector wages in 1998, this gap has been closing over the 
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past ten years as the sector has experienced faster wage growth than either the private or 
public sectors.  The convergence of voluntary sector wage levels on the public sector wages 
has significant implications for the cost-saving potential of policies of the contracting-out of 
public services. 
The analysis of sector differences suffers from a potential bias from sample selection, as 
workers are not allocated to a sector randomly.  We tackle this in two ways.  Firstly, we 
argue that government policy to expand the sector is an exogenous shock increasing the size 
of the sector beyond the warm-glow equilibrium and bringing many new workers into the 
sector.  Secondly, we use the limited panel structure of the LFS with workers switching their 
sector of employment, to estimate a fixed effects model. 
A significant challenge in voluntary sector research is the availability of data in what is still a 
relatively small sector.  In this paper, LFS data collected over the past decade has been 
pooled to permit detailed analysis of the trends in sector wage differences in the last ten 
years. 
A Growing Third Sector 
The starting point for the increasing interest of government in the voluntary sector can be 
traced back to the Deakin Commission on the Future of the Voluntary Sector (Commission 
on the Future of the Voluntary Sector, 1996).  This led to the establishment of the Compact 
(Home Office, 1998), a statement of understanding between government and the voluntary 
sector over the provision of public services. 
“This Compact between Government and the voluntary and community sector 
provides a framework which will help guide our relationship at every level. It 
recognises that Government and the sector fulfil complementary roles in the 
development and delivery of public policy and services, and that the Government has 
a role in promoting voluntary and community activity in all areas of our national life. 
The work of voluntary and community organisations is central to the Government’s 
mission to make this the Giving Age.” 
 The Rt. Hon Tony Blair MP (Home Office, 1998) 
The rationale for the contracting-out of public services was increased value for money, 
incorporating reduced costs, increased quality and greater variety.  For many public services, 
the voluntary sector was seen as having a comparative advantage in the provision of quality; 
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particularly where there were significant information asymmetries between recipient and 
provider. 
From 2002 a number of initiatives were introduced to increase the capacity of the voluntary 
sector to provide public services (National Audit Office, 2005), including a target to increase 
total spending on voluntary organisations.  In the 2004 spending review the explicit target 
was dropped, in favour of a commitment to increase both capacity and overall contribution 
of the sector, measured by an indicator of the size of the sector’s paid and unpaid 
workforce. 
Between 1996 and 2005 the voluntary sector workforce grew by 26%, a much higher rate of 
increase than the private sector (11%) and the public sector (14%) over the same period 
(National Council of Voluntary Organisations, 2007).  This represents a significant number of 
new recruits to the sector.  If the comparative advantage of the sector flows from the efforts 
of “mission-motivated” workers, what can economic theory tell us about motivation in a 
growing sector? 
Theories of Voluntary Sector Wage-Setting 
The economic rationale for the existence of independent nonprofit organisations, or the 
voluntary sector, is based on the combination of the profit non-distribution constraint and 
the existence of intrinsic motivation in those running the organisation (see Rose-Ackerman 
(1986) and Rutherford (2010) for a review).  These two elements allow voluntary 
organisations to more credibly provide services with significant information asymmetries, 
where quality is difficult to observe or contract over, than the private sector.  The removal of 
the profit motive reduces the incentive to cheat on the provision of unobservable quality, 
and gives voluntary organisations an advantage in these industries.  This explains the 
concentration of voluntary organisations in the health, social work and education industries. 
What can theory tell us about wage-setting in the voluntary sector, and how might it be 
different?  There are a number of explanations that come under the banner of “warm glow” 
theories, suggesting that voluntary sector workers gain utility from their work which 
compensates them for lower wages. 
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Compensating Wage Differentials 
Compensating Wage Differentials is the concept that characteristics of the work that affect 
worker utility are reflected in the wage paid for the job.  Classically, this has been shown in 
the form of “danger money”, where workers in dangerous or risky jobs are paid a wage 
premium to compensate for the greater risk of accident that they face in the course of their 
work.  This concept can be generalised to allow for lower wages in the presence of positive 
aspects of the job.  For the voluntary sector, this approach can be applied to the higher 
utility that workers receive from a nonprofit employer. 
The term “warm glow” was used by Andreoni (1990) to describe the utility received by a 
donor from the act of giving, rather than the outcome itself.  More recently Besley and 
Ghatak (2005) outline a model of ‘motivated agents’ that gain utility from producing goods 
or services that are in line with their ‘mission’, essentially a ‘warm glow’ arises from working 
in the voluntary sector.  This warm glow forms part of the compensation received by 
workers for their efforts, and so predicts that motivated workers will accept employment in 
the mission-oriented sector at lower wages than non-motivated agents. 
In this paper we use a simple model of equalising differences to model the effect of warm 
glow on the labour market outcomes.  Warm glow utility can be thought of as providing a 
positive benefit of work in the sector much as unpleasant working conditions might provide 
a negative cost to working in job that is dirty or unsafe.  This model also allows us to 
consider the effects of an increase in the size of the voluntary sector. 
Rosen (1986) outlines the classic model of compensating differentials.  He provides a 
framework for a theory of labour supply to jobs with different (un)desirable attributes.  
These attributes are non-pecuniary by-products of undertaking the job.  Examples provided 
by Rosen include: 
Onerous working conditions 
Regional differences 
Work schedules / unemployment risk 
Composition of pay packages 
Rosen’s model is outlined for an undesirable job attribute, without loss of generality.  I will 
now outline Rosen’s model with a desirable, ‘warm glow’ attribute in place of the 
undesirable attribute.  Following Besley and Ghatak, I abstract from issues of public or 
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private ownership of organisations, and instead discuss a profit-oriented sector and a 
mission-oriented sector.  The mission-oriented sector is distinguished by allowing jobs within 
this sector to carry a non-pecuniary benefit of contributing to the mission – the so-called 
warm glow. 
The Sectors 
The labour market is made up of two sectors, denoted by D = (0, 1).  Sector D=0 is the profit-
oriented sector, and sector D=1 is the mission-oriented sector, where workers receive a 
warm glow utility.  The two sectors pay wages w0 and w1 respectively. 
Workers 
Workers utility is dependent on their consumption of market goods, C, and their work sector 
(D). 
),( DCuU           (1)  
If C0 is the level of market goods consumed by workers in the profit-oriented sector, then C* 
is the consumption level required by workers in the mission-oriented sector to be indifferent 
between the sectors. 
)1*,()0,( 0 CuCu   0* CC       (2) 
We can then define the compensating variation, Z, as: 
 0* CCZ          (3) 
Define the sector wage difference as: 
 10 wwW          (4) 
Workers will be indifferent between taking a job in either of the two sectors if: 
 ZW          (5) 
Z is a personal taste variable that varies from worker to worker.  In the traditional model, Z 
would represent the distaste for an unpleasant characteristic of the job.  In this context 
mission-motivated workers have a low Z, as they get warm-glow utility from engaging in 
activities that are in accordance with their mission-motivation.  Z can be thought of as the 
degree of mission motivation amongst the workforce.  These theories then predict lower 
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wages in the mission-oriented sector, and W can be thought of as the market price for 
accepting a job in the mission-oriented sector. 
Heterogeneous Labour Supply 
The probability density function of tastes in the population is represented by g(Z), and G(Z) is 
the cumulative density function.  Workers for whom iZW  will choose to work in the 
mission-oriented sector (where the loss of wages is not as big as the indifferent level of 
consumption).  This is illustrated in Figure 1.  The shaded area shows the proportion of the 
workforce in the mission-oriented sector, where for an individual worker i: *ZZ i  . 
 
 
Figure 1: Probability Density Function over Z 
The proportion of workers choosing to work in the mission-oriented sector will then be: 
 



W
WGdZZgN )()(1       (6) 
And the proportion of workers in the profit-oriented sector will be: 
 



W
WGdZZgN )(1)(0      (7) 
This model implies that lower wages will be paid in the mission-oriented sector than in the 
profit-oriented sector, but workers will sort into their sector choice depending on their 
valuation of the warm-glow utility. 
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Heterogeneous Labour Demand 
Rosen outlines the demand-side of the labour market similarly, with firms facing variable 
costs to “clean-up” the undesirable job attribute.  This is not so easily applicable to the 
mission-oriented sector.  The nonprofit status of an organisation is a legal institutional 
constraint, and is not easy to change.  Glaeser (2001) outlines a theory of not-for-profit 
entrepreneurs, who forgo the profits of a private firm in order to harness the voluntary 
contributions that a non-profit organisation can elicit.  Entrepreneurs make an optimal 
choice of organisation type, choosing to form a nonprofit organisation when the benefits of 
harnessing contributions to the organisation through the credibility of nonprofit status 
outweigh the potential profits of forming a for-profit organisation. 
Voluntary organisations have a clear incentive to recruit mission-motivated workers.  The 
provision of warm-glow utility as part compensation reduces the costs in the sector, and 
increases the level of output that can be produced in line with the organisation’s aims. 
Product Market Equilibrium 
The growth in the voluntary sector over the past ten years has been driven by an increase in 
the contracting out of public service provision (Kendall, Matosevic, Forder et al., 2003).  In 
recent years the amount of earned income received by voluntary organisations (through 
trading, contracting-out and commissioning) has been growing faster than the total 
voluntary income received through donations (National Council of Voluntary Organisations, 
2008).  In 2003, the total earned income for the voluntary sector exceeded the total 
voluntary income for the first time, and the increase has continued. 
With this in mind, we model the product market of the mission-oriented sector simply as 
supplying services to a public sector buyer.  These services are typically located in the Health 
and Social Work or Education industries.  The public sector has a fixed budget M to spend on 
purchasing services, shown by the budget constraint in equation (8), and so is represented 
by a downward sloping demand curve.   
 PqpqpM VVPP        (8) 
Where VP pp , are the prices and VP qq , are the quantities of services provided by the profit-
oriented and mission-oriented sectors respectively, and P is spending on other public goods. 
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Both the profit-oriented and mission-oriented sectors use the same production technology.  
Increasing the quantity supplied requires an increase in employment, and so organisations 
face an upwards-sloping supply curve. 
 )(Lfq          (9) 
The profit-oriented sector maximises profits: 
 ),(. PPPP
q
wqCqpMax
P
       (10) 
The mission-oriented sector maximises its output given a zero profit condition (due to the 
non-distribution of profits constraint).  
 ),(.0 VVVV wqCqp        (11) 
The increasing demand for mission-oriented sector services is represented in this simple 
model as an exogenous shift in the public sector demand curve.  This is driven by policy 
changes at a national level to contract out the provision of public services. 
The purchaser of services has a demand for services D.  These services can be supplied by 
either the Profit-oriented or Mission-oriented sectors.  The existence of warm-glow wage 
discounts gives the mission-oriented sector a cost advantage in service provision, and so it is 
able to provide the same level of service at a lower price.  The quantity of service demanded 
determines the mission-oriented sector’s demand for labour, and so the equilibrium level of 
Z* and wV. 
Increasing the Voluntary Sector Workforce  
As the mission-oriented sector grows, its demand for labour increases.  In equilibrium the 
marginal worker has a taste for warm glow Zi = Z*.  In order to attract workers for whom the 
utility of working in the profit-oriented sector is higher than that of the mission-oriented 
sector, wV must increase. 
The sector equilibrium wages, wP and wV, result in a split of the labour market at Z*.  
Workers with Zi < Z* will have U(C*, g) > U(C0,0) and so will choose to work in the mission-
oriented sector.  Workers with Zi > Z* will have U(C*, g) < U(C0,0) and so will choose to work 
in the profit-oriented sector.  This proportion is given by N1 in Equation 6.  As the marginal 
worker at Z* is indifferent between working in the two sectors, the size of the mission-
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oriented sector workforce can only be increased by increasing the wV.  The additional 
workers will have Zi>Z*, and so the average level of warm glow utility will reduce in the 
mission-oriented sector.  This increased wage will reduce the size of the warm-glow wage 
differential, and bring wages in the two sectors closer together. 
Figure 2 shows the effect of an expansion in demand for mission-oriented sector production.  
If the purchaser decides to increase the proportion of services sourced from the mission-
oriented sector then this will shift the demand curve DX  rightwards to DX’.  The new 
equilibrium in the labour market will be a higher wage wV’.  The additional workers in the 
mission-oriented sector are provided by the shift in Z* to Z*’.  The additional workers 
recruited all have a preference for warm glow Zi that is lower than the existing mission-
oriented sector workforce.  This in turn reduces the cost advantage of the mission-oriented 
sector.  Over time this would reduce the sector wage-gap as the sector grows. 
These theories can be tested empirically, by estimating sector wage differentials after 
controlling for observable differences in individuals, jobs and organisations. The theory 
makes two predictions: firstly, if the mission-oriented sector workforce is made up of 
individuals with a high taste for warm glow, then we would expect to find a wage discount in 
the sector.  Secondly, as the sector grows, fuelled by an increase in contracting-out, the 
wage gap should narrow.  
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THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR WORKFORCE 
 
 
Figure 2: Expansion of the Mission-oriented Sector 
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Empirical Research on Sectoral Wage Differentials 
There is an extensive literature on the apparent public sector wage premium found by 
examining the mean wages of workers in the two sectors.  This premium is often found even 
after adjusting measures for the different workers characteristics in the two sectors.  Disney 
and Gosling (1998) used the General Household Survey (GHS) and British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) to estimate the public sector premium in the UK after taking worker 
characteristics into account.  They found that for men the premium fell from 5% in 1983 to 
only 1% by the mid-1990’s.  However, for women the public sector premium increased over 
the same period from 11% to 14%.  
Relatively little empirical work has been done where the voluntary sector is examined 
separately as a third sector.  The early literature, primarily using US data, focussed on 
specific industries or professions.3  Weisbrod (1983) examined wage differences between 
lawyers employed by nonprofit and for-profit firms, and found evidence of a nonprofit wage 
discount of ~20%.  His analysis of a job choice equation suggested that lawyers in the 
nonprofit sector held different preferences to those employed in the private sector.  Preston 
(1989) conducted an analysis of the nonprofit sector wage differential for white-collar 
workers using Current Population Survey (CPS) in the US, and found a significant nonprofit 
sector discount of 18% even after controlling for differences in human capital and other 
worker and job characteristics.  She found a larger differential for male workers than female 
workers. 
More recent work has analysed nonprofit wage differential across the whole workforce.  
Leete (2001) used US census data for 1990 and found little evidence of a difference between 
the private and voluntary sectors overall.  However, she did find some significant differences 
at the disaggregated industry level.  Ruhm and Borkoski (2003) undertook both a cross-
sectional and longitudinal analysis of nonprofit compensation using the 1994-98 Current 
Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Groups.  They find little evidence of wage differentials, 
with industry and worker heterogeneity playing a larger role.  They conclude that nonprofit 
wages are set primarily by competitive markets, with little evidence of donated labour 
observed in wages.  Although their dataset has a longitudinal component, this is used only to 
examine workers switching between sectors, and not to analyse changes in wage 
                                                          
3
 See also Mocan and Tekin (2003) 
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differentials across time.  Our contribution to this literature is to examine the evolution of 
the sector wage differentials over time as the sector grows, while also controlling for sample 
selection bias through a fixed effects model. 
The questions that we seek to address in this study are as follows.  Firstly, are there 
significant sector wage differences found in the UK data, and do these support a warm-glow 
theory of wage setting?  Secondly, how have these wage differences evolved in the past ten 
years of government-driven growth in the sector? 
Exploring the Data 
This analysis uses the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS).  The LFS is a rotating panel, collected 
quarterly, following individuals for one year.  The sample used here is for the 10 years from 
1998 Q1 to 2007 Q2.  This nationally collected dataset provides a large representative 
sample of the UK population, across all sectors and industries.  Additionally, the pooled 
cross-sections permit analysis of changing wage differentials following government 
intervention in the market that was not analysed in the previous literature. 
Table 1 below shows the breakdown of the sample by sector and gender. This shows that 
there are around 6,500 workers sampled in the voluntary sector over the 10 year period.  
This means that voluntary sector workers make up only about 2.5% of the sample.  However, 
the proportion of voluntary sector workers in the LFS sample has been growing over the 
period, from about 2.2% in 1998 to 2.7% in 2007. 
Sector                  sex   
      male female  Total 
  Private Sector 95,892 73,458    169,350 
 (56.62%) (43.38%)  
   Public Secto 26,343 49,728 76,071  
                 (34.63%) (65.37%)  
Voluntary Sector 1,850 4,588 6,438  
                  (28.74%) (71.26%)   
    
           Total 124,085 127,774 251,859  
                 (49.27%) (50.73%)  
Table 1: Number and proportions of workers by Sex and Sector 
Source: UK Labour Force Survey (1998-2007) 
The table also shows that the voluntary sector workforce is predominantly female, at over 
71%, and this is higher even than the proportion of women in the public sector. 
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In this paper we look at how voluntary sector wages have changed in the past ten years.  
Figure 3 below shows the mean wages by sector and gender over the ten years of the 
sample period.  In the first figure, the sample mean wages are plotted, showing that public 
sector wages are consistently highest, with private sector wages second and the lowest 
wages in the voluntary sector. 
The second and third panels split the sample into male and female workers, and a quite 
different picture emerges.  Voluntary sector male wages are still lower than the private and 
public sectors, although in 2005 and 2007 they edge above the private sector.  Voluntary 
sector female wages are consistently at a premium to the private sector, but below the 
public sector throughout the ten years. 
However, these differences in the mean wages between sectors could be explained by the 
differences in characteristics between workers in the sectors.  For example, systematic 
differences between the sectors in the age, experience or education of workers could 
explain the observed difference in mean wages.  In this paper we estimate wage equations 
that allow us to control for observable differences in the characteristics of workers between 
sectors, in order to estimate the unexplained sector wage differential.  It is this wage 
differential that would allow us to test the theory of warm-glow wage setting. 
Figure 4 below shows the distribution of years of experience by sector.  Workers in the 
private sector have the fewest years of experience, with the distribution peaking early at 
around 15 years.  Both the public and voluntary sectors have higher proportions of more 
experienced workers, peaking at around 20 to 25 years.  
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Figure 3: Mean Wages 1998 to 2007 by sector 
Source: UK Labour Force Survey (1998-2007)
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Tenure by Sector 
 
  
Figure 4: Histogram of Years Experience by Sector 
Source: UK Labour Force Survey (1998-2007) 
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Methodology 
In this paper we estimate three models.  The first specification is a Mincer wage equation 
estimated on pooled cross-sectional data.  The second specification interacts the sector and 
year variables to explore how the sector wage differentials have evolved over the past ten 
years.  The third specification uses a smaller panel dataset to estimate a fixed effects model 
using workers switching between sectors. 
MODEL ONE: Pooled Cross-Section 
In keeping with the existing literature, wage equations are estimated using a Mincer 
Equation (see (Heckman, Lochner, & Todd, 2006) for a review).  This models wages with the 
equation: 
ln 𝑤𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽𝐸𝑋𝑃2𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖
2 + 𝜀𝑖  (12) 
This framework allows other controls to be added in order to test various hypotheses.  
Controls are included for age, experience, tenure, education, part-time working, 
organisation size, temporary work, occupation, industry, region and time.   
ln 𝑤𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑃𝑈𝐵𝑃𝑈𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽𝐸𝑋𝑃2𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖
2 +
𝜷𝑿.𝑿𝒊 + 𝜀𝑖        (13) 
 
Where PUB and VOL are sector dummy variables, and X is a collection of relevant control 
variables.  The equations are estimated separately for male and female workers.  In order to 
correct for potential selectivity bias due to non-participation (Heckman, 1979) a sample 
selection equation was estimated jointly with the wage equations.  This probit model of 
labour force participation included age, marital status, current study, and disability as 
independent variables.   
The summarised estimation results are shown in Table 2 columns (1) and (2) below.  This 
table shows the results for male and female workers across the whole ten-year sample, with 
the estimated coefficients for public sector, voluntary sector, age, experience and tenure 
reported.  Additional explanatory variables included in the model estimation but not 
reported include age, education, organisation size, occupation, industry, region, and time 
dummies for year and quarter. 
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Male workers in voluntary sector receive 12.2% lower wages than the private sector.  Those 
in the public sector receive 2.6% less than the private sector.4  Wages for female workers in 
the voluntary sector are higher than the private sector by 1.5%, while those in the public 
sector earn 3.4% more than their colleagues in the private sector. 
MODEL TWO: Wage Differentials over time 
This model allows us to explore the evolution of the sector wage differences over time.  In 
the past ten years the voluntary sector has experienced significant growth, and has also seen 
a significant shift in its main source of funding from donated income to revenue from 
services.  How has this affected wages in the voluntary sector? 
The LFS data has been used to estimate wage differentials over time using the pooled-cross-
section model, with the sector dummies interacted with the year dummies. 
 PUBLICPRIVXYEARPRIVATECONSEXPEDUCw PUBPRIVYRPRIV )],(ln[
  XβX
2
2 EXPEXPEDUCPUBXYEAR EXPEXPEDUCPUBYR   (14) 
Table 2 below shows the estimates of this model, in columns (3) and (4). Also reported are 
the year and sector interactions for 2004 to 2007.  The coefficient on the sector dummies 
now represents the estimated wage differential in 1998, the base year.  The sector year 
interactions show how this wage differential has evolved over time.  Male workers begin 
with wage premiums in the private and public sectors of 21.5% and 20.9% respectively.   This 
premium reduces over the ten years, dropping to 3.7% in the private sector and 0.9% in the 
public sector by 2007.  Female workers in 1999 earned 6.4% more in the public sector than 
the voluntary sector, but with no significant difference from the private sector.  The private 
sector year interactions are not statistically significant, however the public sector premium 
falls across the ten years to only 1.3% in 2007. 
                                                          
4
 The sector coefficients βVOLS and βPUB have been converted from log coefficients to percentages as 
per Halvorsen & Palmqvist (1980) 
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MODELS (1) AND (2):  POOLED CROSS-SECTION WAGE EQUATIONS 
 MODEL ONE  MODEL TWO  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Basic: Male Basic: Female Interact: Male Interact: Female 
Public Sector -0.0262 0.0490 -0.00469 0.0652 
 (0.00446)
***
 (0.00322)
***
 (0.00938) (0.00744)
***
 
     
Voluntary Sector -0.130 0.0148 -0.199 0.00266 
 (0.00939)
***
 (0.00566)
***
 (0.0311)
***
 (0.0186) 
     
Experience 0.0102 0.00265 0.0102 0.00267 
 (0.000915)
***
 (0.000875)
***
 (0.000915)
***
 (0.000875)
***
 
     
Exper2 /100 -4.957 -4.275 -4.960 -4.276 
 (0.170)
***
 (0.175)
***
 (0.170)
***
 (0.175)
***
 
     
Tenure 0.0129 0.0145 0.0129 0.0145 
 (0.000368)
***
 (0.000378)
***
 (0.000369)
***
 (0.000379)
***
 
     
Tenure2 /100 -0.0202 -0.0200 -0.0201 -0.0199 
 (0.00111)
***
 (0.00133)
***
 (0.00111)
***
 (0.00133)
***
 
     
Part-Time -0.0652 -0.0363 -0.0653 -0.0363 
 (0.00506)
***
 (0.00217)
***
 (0.00506)
***
 (0.00217)
***
 
     
Temporary Job -0.0411 -0.0360 -0.0410 -0.0359 
 (0.00552)
***
 (0.00431)
***
 (0.00552)
***
 (0.00431)
***
 
     
PublicX2004   -0.0252 -0.00696 
   (0.0116)
**
 (0.00905) 
     
PublicX2005   -0.0235 -0.0128 
   (0.0118)
**
 (0.00921) 
     
PublicX2006   -0.0142 -0.0144 
   (0.0118) (0.00910) 
     
PublicX2007   -0.0239 -0.0275 
   (0.0141)
*
 (0.0107)
**
 
     
VoluntaryX2004   0.0552 0.00552 
   (0.0400) (0.0239) 
     
VoluntaryX2005   0.154 0.0308 
   (0.0413)
***
 (0.0243) 
     
VoluntaryX2006   0.106 0.0323 
   (0.0409)
***
 (0.0234) 
     
VoluntaryX2007   0.150 0.0218 
   (0.0483)
***
 (0.0277) 
     
_cons 1.188 1.524 0.876 1.181 
 (0.0253)
***
 (0.0246)
***
 (0.0252)
***
 (0.0246)
***
 
N 120169 124297 120169 124297 
R
2
 0.548 0.561 0.549 0.561 
AIC 102076.1 83749.9 102052.7 83756.2 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
(Models (1a) and (1b):               Models (2a) and (2b): 
      The experience and tenure variables are measured in years.  The Sector/Year interactions for 
  XβXPUBPRIVCONSw PUBPRIV)ln(  PUBPRIVXYRPRIVCONSw PUBPRIVYRPRIV )ln(
  XβXPUBXYRPUBYR
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1999-2003 have been omitted from the table to save space. Additional explanatory variables included in the model 
estimation but not reported above include Age, Education, Organisation Size, Occupation, Industry, Region, Year 
and Quarter.)  
 
Table 2: Pooled Cross Section Estimation Results 
Source: UK Labour Force Survey (1998-2007)
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Figure 5 below graphs these year specific dummies combined with the estimated individual 
sector and year effects, relative to private sector wages in 1998.  These plots are produced 
by adding the year, sector, and interaction effects for each sector, and taking the Private 
sector wage level in each year as the base. 
We can see that for male workers the voluntary sector wage discount was greatest in 1998, 
and the gap has been closing steadily over the ten-year period.  For female workers, 
voluntary sector wages began on a par with the private sector, but with a significant 
discount from the public sector.  Until 2004, voluntary sector wages seem to track the 
private sector wage growth, however in the last three years of this period they increase at a 
faster rate, approaching the public sector premium. 
Model Three: Fixed Effects 
The third model makes use of the limited panel structure of the UK Labour Force Survey.  
The dataset is a rotating panel, with workers surveyed quarterly and exiting after a year.  
This model uses the first and fifth waves of the panel, one year apart, as these are the two 
waves where participants are asked about the wage in their primary employment. 
Estimating a panel model allows us to control for individual fixed effects by observing the 
same individuals in two sectors.  Although this tackles some of the criticisms of cross-
sectional analysis of wage differences, we must also address a number of issues.  Firstly, 
sector effects are now identified by those individuals who are observed in both sectors.  This 
requires that there are sufficient observations to fully identify the effects.  The relatively 
small size of the voluntary sector makes this more difficult, but by combining several years 
of the LFS we have assembled sufficient observations.   
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Notes: The wage differentials are calculated summing the sector, year and interaction effects for each 
sector.  The 95% confidence interval shown is for the voluntary sector estimates. The 95% confidence 
interval shows the interval around the voluntary sector wage level compared to the private sector 
base. 
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Figure 5: Estimated Wage Differentials 1998 – 2007 
Source: UK Labour Force Survey (1998-2007)
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Secondly, there is still a potential issue of sector selection as the decision to move job is not 
strictly exogenous.  The ideal case would be a organisation switching sector as an exogenous 
shock.  However organisations very rarely move into and out of the voluntary sector, and we 
would require observations on many employees of the firm to identify organisational 
effects.  The detailed worker data, collected so close to the sector switch, is likely to be the 
closest we will come to a random panel dataset of sector moves.  Thirdly, estimating a fixed 
effects model increases the potential bias due to measurement error.  For this reason we 
use only the data collected contemporaneously by personal or telephone interview, and do 
not extend the dataset to analyse data recalled from the twelve months prior to selection 
into the LFS. 
Describing the sector switchers 
Table 3 shows the panel sample by sector, gender and wave.  Workers in the voluntary 
sector make up about 1.5% of the male workforce and about 3.5% of the female workforce. 
 Male    Female 
Sector Wave 1 Wave 5 Total  Wave 1 Wave 5 Total 
Private Sector 36,768 36,440 73,208  25,709 25,083 50,792 
Public Sector 11,309 10,896 22,205  19,969 19,454 39,423 
Voluntary Sector 744 758 1,502  1,653 1,739 3,392 
Total 48,821 48,094 96,915  47,331 46,276 93,607 
Table 3: Panel Sample by Wave and Gender 
Source: UK Labour Force Survey (1997-2002) 
Table 4 shows a breakdown of the sector switchers between waves 1 and 5 of the LFS.  
Unsurprisingly the majority of workers in each sector do not switch over the year of 
observation.   
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  Wave 1       
  Private   Public   Voluntary  
Wave 5  Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent 
Private Male 36,062 73.87  594 1.22  136 0.28 
 Female 24,340 51.43  815 1.72  329 0.7 
          
Public Male 634 1.3  10,647 21.81  61 0.12 
 Female 1,167 2.47  19,003 40.15  131 0.28 
          
Voluntary Male 72 0.15  68 0.14  547 1.12 
 Female 202 0.43  151 0.32  1,193 2.52 
          
Table 4: Panel Sample by Wave and Gender 
Source: UK Labour Force Survey (1997-2002) 
For males, 337 workers (0.7%) and for females, 813 workers (1.7%) switch into or out of the 
voluntary sector.  Although these sector switchers form a small proportion of the whole 
sample, they represent a significant proportion of voluntary sector workers.  This is 
indicative of the fact that voluntary sector workers make up about 4% of the UK workforce.  
By way of comparison, in 2004/05 the university sector employed an estimated total of 
284,000 workers, or just over 1% of the workforce (HEFCE, 2006). 
Figure 6 below shows the distribution of log hourly wage by sector and sector move.  This 
shows that there is a greater spread in the distribution of private sector wages compared to 
the voluntary sector. 
The graph in Figure 7 below shows employees’ tenure with their employer at their first 
observation in the LFS, that is before they switch sector.  Workers in the public sector have 
the flattest tenure distribution, while workers in the voluntary sector have the steepest.  
Overall workers who switch during the time they are observed have much steeper tenure 
distributions, suggesting that those moving jobs are likely to move again.  Workers moving 
between the private and voluntary sectors have the shortest tenures, while those moving 
into and out of the public sector tend to have longer tenures.  
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HOURLY PAY AND TENURE FOR SECTOR SWITCHERS 
 
Figure 6: Histogram of log hourly pay by sector move 
Source: UK Labour Force Survey  
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Figure 7: Histogram of employee tenure by sector move 
Source: UK Labour Force Survey
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Estimating the model 
The model estimated is a fixed effects estimator with two time periods, regressing log hourly 
wages on a set of explanatory variables with sector dummy variables.  Separate models are 
estimated for male and female workers. 
 itVOLitPUBYRitPUBit VOLPUBXYEARPUBw 0]ln[
itiititEXPitEDUCitVOLYR EXPEDUCVOLXYEAR   XβX
2
2
 (15) 
Results 
The Fixed effects estimation results can be seen in Table 5 below. The time dummies and 
sector/year interactions for the Public Sector have been omitted from the table to save 
space. Additional explanatory variables included in the model estimation but not reported 
above include education, organisation size, industry, and region. 
They show a public sector wage premium in 1997 of ~3.5% and a voluntary sector wage 
discount of ~12.5% for male workers.  For female workers there is a public sector premium 
of ~5.7% and no significant voluntary sector wage difference. 
The change in sector wage differentials by year can be seen in Figure 8 below.  For both male 
and female workers wages in the voluntary sector grow faster than the private and public 
sectors.  Male workers begin with a significant voluntary sector wage discount, which 
disappears across the time period.  Female workers begin and end with no statistically 
significant wage difference, although the estimated premium grows over the period.  For 
male workers the public sector premium is steady over the time period, while it rises slightly 
for female workers. 
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MODEL 3: FIXED EFFECTS WAGE EQUATIONS 
 (3a) (3b) 
 FE: Male FE: Female 
Public Sector 0.0322 0.0585 
 (0.0137)
**
 (0.0115)
***
 
   
Voluntary Sector -0.137 0.0108 
 (0.0354)
***
 (0.0258) 
   
VoluntaryX1998 0.0583 0.0180 
 (0.0240)
**
 (0.0183) 
   
VoluntaryX1999 0.106 0.0280 
 (0.0346)
***
 (0.0252) 
   
VoluntaryX2000 0.129 0.0160 
 (0.0396)
***
 (0.0280) 
   
VoluntaryX2001 0.160 0.0260 
 (0.0423)
***
 (0.0296) 
   
VoluntaryX2002 0.176 0.0519 
 (0.0467)
***
 (0.0323) 
   
Age
2
 /100 -0.0747 -0.0691 
 (0.00680)
***
 (0.00732)
***
 
   
Tenure 0.00366 0.00216 
 (0.00107)
***
 (0.00122)
*
 
   
Tenure
2
 /100 0.00388 0.00618 
 (0.00385) (0.00545) 
   
Part Time 0.0226 0.0378 
 (0.0106)
**
 (0.00534)
***
 
   
Temporary Job -0.0256 -0.0126 
 (0.00788)
***
 (0.00659)
*
 
   
_cons 3.119 2.586 
 (0.112)
***
 (0.116)
***
 
N 96915 93607 
R
2
 0.064 0.060 
AIC -140914.7 -130812.3 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
(Model (3a) and (3b):  
The age and tenure variables are measured in years.  The Sector/Year interactions for the Public Sector have been 
omitted from the table to save space. Additional explanatory variables included in the model estimation but not 
reported above include Education, Organisation Size, Industry, Region, and Year dummies.  Age is omitted due to 
collinearity, as all worker observations are one year apart.)  
 
 itPUBitPRIVYRitPRIVit PUBLICPRIVXYEARPRIVATECONSw ]ln[ itiititEXPitEDUCitPUBYR EXPEDUCPUBXYEAR   XβX
2
2
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Table 5: Fixed Effects Panel Estimation Results 
Source: UK Labour Force Survey (1997-2002) 
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Notes: The wage differentials are calculated summing the sector, year and interaction effects for each 
sector.  The differentials for the public and voluntary sectors are shown relative to the private sector 
as a base in each year.  The 95% confidence interval shows the interval around the voluntary sector 
wage level compared to the private sector base. 
Figure 8: Estimated Wage Differentials 1997 – 2002 
Source: UK Labour Force Survey (1997-2002) 
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These findings were supported even after controlling for worker fixed effects using the 
limited panel structure of the Labour Force Survey.  This suggests that the findings are not 
simply explained by sector selections effects due to unobserved worker heterogeneity. 
This decade has seen a significant expansion of the voluntary sector workforce.  The theory 
of compensating wage differentials that forms the basis for warm-glow theories of wage-
setting clearly predicts that as the voluntary sector expands the warm-glow wage gap should 
narrow. 
We must also rule-out alternative explanations for the sector wage growth over this period.  
Firstly we consider gender differences.  If the additional voluntary sector workers have been 
disproportionately male, then this could explain the greater erosion of the male wage 
differential.  Figure 9 shows the proportion of male workers by sector over the sample 
period.  This suggests that the proportion of male workers has actually fallen slightly, from 
29% in 1998 to 26% in 2007. 
Alternatively, it is feasible that as public services have been contracted out to the voluntary 
sector the unions have followed the workforce.  If there has been an increase in unionisation 
in the voluntary sector in response to the growth of the workforce, then this could explain in 
part the faster wage growth.   
Figure 9 also shows the proportion of workers who are union members, and the proportion 
of workers who report that a union is present at their place of work, by sector.  This shows 
clearly that the proportion of workers in the voluntary sector who are union members has 
fallen since 1998 from 29% to 18% in 2006.  This suggests that the move of workers from the 
public to the voluntary sectors has not been driven by an increase in unionisation.  In fact, 
the reverse is true: wage growth has been higher in the voluntary sector despite a decline in 
unionisation within the sector. 
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GENDER BALANCE AND UNION MEMBERSHIP 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Gender Balance, Union Membership and Presence by Sector 
Source: UK Labour Force Survey (1998-2006) 
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This analysis also suggests that as the voluntary sector expands the average level of warm-
glow motivation reduces.  What else could cause this effect?  The conclusions drawn depend 
on a stable distribution of Z in the population: if workers become more altruistic then the 
distribution of Z will shift, and we could expect an increase in the size of the sector without 
warm glow reducing. 
 National Survey of Volunteering Citizenship Survey 
 1981 1991 1997 2001 2003 2005 
Formal Volunteering in Past 12 months 44% 51% 48% 39% 42% 44% 
Regular Formal Volunteering in past 12 months 27% 31% 29% 27% 28% 29% 
Table 6: Percentage of Formal Volunteers over time
5
 
Source:(Low, Butt, Ellis Paine, & Davis Smith, 2007) 
We argue that despite the increasing size of the voluntary sector the distribution of Z has 
remained constant.  We consider levels of formal volunteering, undertaken without pay, as a 
proxy for the levels of mission-motivation in the population.  Table 6 shows the percentage 
of the population who reported having undertaken formal volunteering work in the previous 
12 months.  Figures are shown for both once-off and regular volunteering.  They show that 
levels of volunteering have not significantly increased since 1997: in fact they seem to have 
experienced a dip compared to volunteering levels in the early 1990’s.  If the sector was 
growing due to an increase in altruism in the population (and so a shifting Z distribution) we 
would reasonably expect that levels of unpaid volunteering would also show a similar 
change.  This supports our assertion that the growth of the voluntary sector workforce has 
been fuelled by a movement of Z*, rather than by an increase in the number of altruistic 
workers in the population. 
If the distribution of Z has remained fairly constant, and so the average level of mission-
motivation in the voluntary sector has fallen, what are the consequences?  Firstly, the scale 
of the problem depends on the shape of the distribution of Z, the taste for warm glow.  If it 
is relatively uniform, then there will be little difference between existing and new voluntary 
sector workers.  If however it is peaked, then the introduction of new workers could have 
significant impacts on the make-up of the voluntary sector workforce.  Two potential 
impacts of this are identified. 
                                                          
5
 Figures from the Helping Out survey in 2006 showing higher volunteering proportions.  However the 
report notes that methodological differences mean that the figures for 2006 are not comparable with 
previous surveys. 
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Firstly, if the mission of an organisation in determined by negotiation between the 
employees then the introduction of employees with weaker mission-oriented motivation 
could have implications for the strength and type of mission.  The theoretical rationale for 
voluntary sector provision of public services is that the combination of the profit non-
distribution constraint and the intrinsic motivation of workers allows the credible provision 
of quality where there are significant information asymmetries between provider and 
purchasers or recipients.  If the mission, or level of intrinsic motivation is diluted, then this 
could have implications for the comparative advantage of voluntary organisations in the 
provision of these types of services. 
Besley and Ghatak extend their Principal-Agent model to allow a spectrum of missions that 
the Principal and Agent bargain over.  They show how compromising on mission can be used 
as an alternative to incentive pay.  The converse of this is that as incentive pay increases in 
the voluntary sector, and wages converge, there is less of a role for mission-matching 
between principals and agents. 
Akerlof (1986) discussed reciprocal gift exchange in the workplace, where workplace norms 
provide the framework for a system of reciprocal effort.  The introduction of new workers 
who do not share these norms could cause this reciprocal equilibrium within the 
organisation to collapse, and reduce effort even amongst the most mission-motivated 
workers. 
Secondly, a further rationale for contracting-out public services is to reap efficiency and 
cost-saving benefits from the competitive tendering of services.  At least some of these 
benefits arise from the lower wage levels attributed to warm glow.  However the findings in 
this paper suggest that the effect over the past ten years of this policy has been strong 
growth in voluntary sector pay for both male and female workers, as pay in the sector has 
converged on pay levels in the public sector.  This will have significantly eroded the cost 
benefits of the policy. 
There are a number of caveats that should be highlighted in interpreting these results.  The 
LFS has been chosen for this analysis due to the richness and high quality of the worker data 
that it includes.  But, given the nature of the voluntary sector, it is not without fault.  Sector 
data is recorded only for respondents’ main jobs, and not for secondary or further jobs.  
Since many jobs in the voluntary sector are part-time and/or temporary, it is conceivable 
that they make up a greater proportion of these omitted jobs.  This suggests that the 
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estimate of sector size provided by the UK LFS is certainly a lower bound.  Given the types of 
jobs involved, this effect is likely to be minor in the estimation, but is an ongoing issue for 
voluntary sector researchers and is worthy of note. 
Conclusion 
As with the findings in the US literature, the evidence for warm-glow wages is not clear cut.  
Although male workers are paid less in the voluntary sector, this wage-gap has been 
narrowing in the UK in recent years, and now appears to be non-existent.  For female 
workers (who make up more than two thirds of the voluntary sector workforce), the analysis 
suggests a small voluntary sector premium above the private sector.  While female workers 
still earn less than their colleagues in the public sector, the gap between the voluntary and 
public sectors has been narrowing. 
We have tackled the issue of sector selection bias by both examining the labour market in 
the voluntary sector in the face of an exogenous shock, and through the analysis of a fixed 
effects model to control for unobserved worker heterogeneity.  This has shown that the 
results are robust even after controlling for a potential sample selection bias. 
Over the past ten years the voluntary sector has moved closer to the market, engaging in 
competitive tendering and commissioning processes for service provision.  The government 
has specifically targeted increasing the capacity of sector to provide public services.  This 
paper has shown that during this period the sector has seen significant growth, both as a 
proportion of the UK workforce and in the workers’ pay.   
We have explored the consequences of a government initiative to expand a specific sector 
through contracting-out public services.  The motive for this policy was based on increasing 
value for money, in terms of cost, quality and variety.  Through our analysis of voluntary 
sector workforce data, we argue that this policy has in fact had the opposite effect, by 
increasing wages to public sector levels and diluting the mission-motivation of workers in 
the sector. 
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